Methodology
The subtopics in a Decent Work Check (DWC)[37] have been used to structure 46 questions under the indicators in constructing this Index. However, what differentiates the Labour Rights Index from the Decent Work Checks is that it is more specific, adds newer topics like pregnancy inquiry, comparison between minimum age for employment and compulsory schooling age, and scoring of trade union questions is not solely dependent on labour legislation in the country. Forty-six data points are obtained across 10 indicators, each containing four to five binary questions. Each indicator represents an aspect of work which is considered important for achieving decent work.[38] The scores for each indicator are obtained by computing the unweighted average of the answers under that indicator and scaling the result to 100. The final scores for the countries are then determined by taking each indicator’s average, where 100 is the maximum score to achieve. Where an indicator has four questions, each question/component has a score of 25.
Where an indicator has five questions, each question/component has a score of 20. A Labour Rights Index score of 100 would indicate that there are no statutory decent work deficits in the areas covered by the Index.
Conceptual Framework
The Index consists of ten elements disaggregated into 46 components. These indicators and their components are presented below. Detailed description for each component can be found in the section on Indicators for Decent Work.
To illustrate the scoring process in the Index, Kenya, for example, receives a score of 100 under the indicator of Child and Forced Labour. This signifies that the country has legal protections in place for young workers participating in the labour market. However, under the indicator of Family responsibilities, Kenya scores 50 since the legislation does not guarantee parental leave and flexible work arrangements for workers with family responsibilities.
Scoring along these lines for a country, the overall score of Kenya is determined by taking the unweighted average of the scores for all 10 indicators on a 0-100 scale, where 0 represents the worst regulatory performance and 100 the best regulatory performance in the labour market. The overall score for Kenya is 66. For a comparison with other countries, please refer to the overall scores table at the start of this report.
The labour legislation of the 135 countries, applicable on 1 January 2022, is the source of information used to answer questions in the Labour Rights Index. The Index does not take into account COVID-19-related labour market measures initiated by countries. Strengths and limitations exist with this approach. While the Labour Rights Index has been designed to be an easily replicable tool to benchmark countries, there are certain advantages and limitations. To ensure comparability of data across 135 economies, specific assumptions have been made. The indicators in the Index are based on standardised assumptions to make the laws comparable across countries. For instance, an assumption used for this Index is that the worker in question who is affected by the labour laws has experience of one year or more at a workplace, as questions on annual leave and severance pay can only apply to this kind of worker. Hence, workers with temporary contracts of a duration of less than one year may not have access to such rights.
Another assumption underlying the Index is that the focus is on the labour legislation, which applies to the most populous province/state/area of a country.
This allows the Index to give a more accurate depiction of a country’s labour rights as the labour laws affect most of its population, even though the legislation affecting workers in areas with lower populations may be different.
Furthermore, the Index is also based on labour legislation which applies to the formal economy in the private sector. Despite more than 60 per cent of the global workforce in need of transitioning from informal to the formal economy,[39] focusing on the labour laws affecting the formal sector retains attention on the sector since the labour laws in the formal economy are more applicable and that is the ultimate goal. ILO Recommendation 204 also recommends gradual transition from the informal to the formal economy through the enactment of necessary legislation and reduction of barriers to transition. Focusing on the formal economy and its applicable legislation also indicates the kind of rights that will be available to the informal economy workers on successful transition to the formal economy.
Other than statutes, the Labour Rights Index also considers general or inter-professional collective agreements applicable at the national level. For countries where minimum wages are determined through collective bargaining, sectoral agreements (for major economic sectors) can also be considered.
Strengths and Limitations of the Labour Rights Index
| Feature | Strength | Limitation |
| Standardised assumptions | Makes labour legislation comparable across countries and methodology uncomplicated | Limits legislation under review |
| Focus on workers having one year or more at a workplace | Allows maximum coverage of labour rights | Does not consider the rights of casual and temporary workers. Non-standard workers may not have access to some of the workplace rights and components under the Labour Rights Index |
| Coverage of most populous province/state/area | Makes labour legislation comparable across countries where different areas have different labour laws for their populations; Gives a more accurate picture of a country’s labour rights | Can decrease representativeness of labour rights where differences in laws across areas exist |
| Focus on the formal economy | Retains attention on the formal sector where labour laws are more applicable | Does not cover the rights of the workforce in the informal economy, which could have a substantial part of the labour force in some countries |
| Use of codified national labour legislation only | Allows actionable indicators since the law can be changed by policymakers | Where lack of implementation of labour legislation, making changes solely in the law will not gain the desired outcome; Does not consider socio-cultural norms |
Moreover, this report acknowledges the presence of gaps between legislation and its practice. For instance, gaps could stem from the lack of implementation of laws because of poor enforcement, weak design, or limited capacity.
Still, observing differences in legislation helps give a clearer understanding of where labour rights may be limited in practice.
This study also recognises the presence of social, economic and cultural factors affecting the practice of legal rights. For example, women may not be working at night, although legally allowed, as social and cultural norms could restrain such options. Or a lack of safe transport may limit women’s employment during night hours.
Poverty-stricken areas may have children under the minimum working age being employed for long hours and not in light work. Workers may be doing overtime exceeding the weekly hour limit because the culture at their organisations may view such workers as harder working and thus more deserving of a reward.The Labour Rights Index 2022 acknowledges the restraints of its standardised assumptions and focuses on codified law. Even if these assumptions do not cover all the labour force in the country, they ensure the comparability of data.
Unlike other indices, the Labour Rights Index does not consider ratification of international conventions in its scoring or rating system since mere ratification is not a good indicator of actual implementation of international labour standards. It uses the standards prescribed in these Conventions (e.g., 14 weeks of maternity leave or the minimum age for hazardous work as 18 years) and scores countries on that basis.
All the 10 indicators and 46 evaluation criteria of the Labour Rights Index are grounded in substantive elements of the Decent Work Agenda. The legal basis for all components (regulatory standards) emanates from the UN or ILO Conventions. Table explains in detail these legal sources.
In summary, the Labour Rights Index methodology has various useful features. The methodology:
- Is transparent and based on facts taken directly from codified laws.
- Uses standardised assumptions for data collection, thereby making logical comparisons across countries.
- Allows data to identify the labour rights and their presence (or lack of) in the legislation of 135 countries.
International Regulatory Standards and Labour Rights Index
| Indicators and Components | Source of the Regulatory Standard | |
| 1. Fair Wages | ||
| 1 | Minimum wage (statutory or negotiated) | Article 23 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 3 of Minimum Wage Fixing Convention 1970 (No. 131); Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (Fair Wage clauses) |
| 2 | Regular wage | Article 12 (1) of Protection of Wages Convention 1949 (No. 95); Article 11 (6) and 12 of Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards) Convention 1962 (No. 117) |
| 3 | Overtime premium (≥125%) | Article 6 of Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 1919 (No. 1); Article 7 of the Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1930 (No. 30) |
| 4 | Weekly rest work compensation (time-off) | Article 5 of the Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921 (No. 14); Article 8 (3) of the Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1957 (No. 106)[1] |
| 5 | Night work premium | Article 8 of Night Work Convention, 1990 (No. 171) |
| 2. Decent Working Hours | ||
| 6 | General working hours (≤48 hours per week) | Article 2 of Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 1919 (No. 1); Article 3 of the Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1930 (No. 30); Article 1 of the Forty-Hour Week Convention, 1935 (No. 47) |
| 7 | Maximum working hours (≤56 hours per week) | Para 17 of the Reduction of Hours of Work Recommendation, 1962 (No. 116); Article 6 (2) of Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 1919 (No. 1); Article 7 (3) of the Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1930 (No. 30) |
| 8 | Weekly rest (≥24 hours) | Articles 3-6 of Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 1919 (No. 1); Article 2 of Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention 1921; Article 6 of Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1957 |
| 9 | Paid public holidays | Article 5 of Working Conditions (Hotels and Restaurants) Convention 1991 (No. 172); Article 6 (1) of Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised) 1970 (No. 132); Article 7 (c) of the Part-Time Work Convention, 1994 (No. 175) |
| 10 | Annual leave (≥3 working weeks) | Article 3 of Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised) 1970 (No. 132) |
| 3. Employment Security | ||
| 11 | Written employment contract | Articles 7-8 of the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189); Part II (5) of the Private Employment Agencies Recommendation, 1997 (No. 188) |
| 12 | Fixed term contract (≤5 years) | Article 2 (3) of the Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (No. 158); Article 3 (2) of the Termination of Employment Recommendation, 1982 (No. 166) |
| 13 | Probation period (≤3 months) | Article 2 (b) of the Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (No. 158) |
| 14 | Termination notice period (1 month) | Article 11 of the Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (No. 158) |
| 15 | Severance pay (≥14 days per year of service) | Article 12 of the Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (No. 158) |
| 4. Family Responsibilities | ||
| 16 | Parental leave | Article 1 of the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156); Paragraph 22 of the Workers with Family Responsibilities Recommendation, 1981 (No. 165); Paragraph 10 of the Maternity Protection Recommendation, 2000 (No. 191) |
| 17 | Paternity leave (≥1 week) | 2009 ILC Resolution Concerning Gender Equality at the Heart of Decent Work |
| 18 | Flexible working arrangements | Article 1 of the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156); Paragraph 18 of the Workers with Family Responsibilities Recommendation, 1981 (No. 165); Article 9 (2) of the Part-Time Work Convention, 1994 (No. 175) |
| 19 | Nursing breaks | Article 10 of the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183) |
| 5. Maternity at Work | ||
| 20 | Prohibition on inquiring about pregnancy | Article 9 of the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183) |
| 21 | Maternity leave (≥14 weeks) | Article 4 of the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183); Article 11 (2) of UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) |
| 22 | Cash maternity benefits (≥66.67% of former wage) | Article 6 of the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183) |
| 23 | Source of maternity benefits (social insurance or state financing) | Article 6(8) of the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183) |
| 24 | Protection from dismissals (pregnancy/maternity) | Article 8 of the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183); Article 11 (2) (a) of UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) |
| 6. Safe Work | ||
| 25 | Personal protective equipment (free of cost) | Article 16 and 21 of the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155) |
| 26 | Training on health and safety | Article 19 (d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155) |
| 27 | Restriction on work (prejudicial to health of mother or child) | Article 3 of the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183) |
| 28 | Employment injury benefits | Part VI of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102) |
| 7. Social Security | ||
| 29 | Old age pension | Part V of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102) |
| 30 | Survivors’ pension | Part X of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102) |
| 31 | Unemployment benefits | Part IV of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102) |
| 32 | Sickness benefits (≥ 6 months) | Part III of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102) |
| 33 | Invalidity benefits | Part IX of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102) |
| 8. Fair Treatment | ||
| 34 | Prohibition of employment discrimination | Article 2 of the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111); Articles 8 and 9 of the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183); Article 4 of the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) Convention, 1983 (No. 159); Article 1 of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Article 5 and 27 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities |
| 35 | Equal remuneration for work of equal value | Article 2 of the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) |
| 36 | Prohibition of sexual harassment | Article 7 of the Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190) |
| 37 | Absence of restrictions on women’s employment | Article 2 of the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) |
| 38 | Basic labour protections for gig workers | Global Commission on the Future of Work 2019[2]; Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration), 2017 |
| 9. Child and Forced Labour | ||
| 39 | Prohibition on child labour (<15 years) | Article 2 of Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No. 138); Article 32 (2) of the Convention on Rights of Child |
| 40 | Age (employment entry ≥ compulsory schooling) | Article 2(3) of Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No. 138) |
| 41 | Prohibition on hazardous work for under 18 | Article 3 of Minimum Age Convention 1973 (No. 138); Article 32 (1) of the Convention on Rights of Child |
| 42 | Prohibition on forced labour | Article 2 of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930; Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights |
| 10. Trade Union | ||
| 43 | Right to unionise | Article 2 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) |
| 44 | Right to collective bargaining | Article 4 of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), Article 2 of the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154) |
| 45 | Right to strike | Para 751, Compilation of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association, 2018 |
| 46 | Prohibition on replacing striking workers | Article 1 of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) |
Data Sources and Collection
While the Index is essentially based on Decent Work Checks, the Index has at least 20 new countries for which Decent Work Checks are yet to be developed. For all countries, labour legislation, including various decrees, amendments and collective agreements, was revisited to score each component and provide a direct legal basis. The legal basis has been provided in individual country profiles. The cut-off date for all data collection is 1 January 2022. Any legislation or change in the law that occurs after said date, where the effective date is set later than 1 January 2022, or where the effective date is not yet precisely known, is not reflected in the Index.
However, the situation in individual countries might have shifted.
The Scoring System
We use a dichotomous scoring system for the 46 indicators (1 for a yes and 0 for a no).
Non-binary scores (such as a scale of 1 to 5) introduce difficulties in defining meaningful and comparable standards or guidelines for each score. This can lead to arbitrary, erroneous and incomparable scores. For example, a 2 for one country may be a 3 for another, and so on.
Alternatively, an expert may find a country- specific indicator that differs from another country. This violates a fundamental principle of measurement known as reliability – the degree to which a measurement procedure produces accurate measurements every time, regardless of who performed it.
Weights
The Labour Rights Index does not use weights. Each indicator features either four or five underlying components framed as questions. Every component contributes equally to the indicator, and every indicator contributes equally to the overall score. The overall score (from 0-100) is calculated from a simple unweighted average of scores from 10 indicators.
As pointed out at the outset, the indicators and components of the Labour Rights Index cover the employment lifecycle of a person. Consider the example of annual leave and sick leave. While annual leave is accessed by a greater percentage of workers every year compared with sick leave, giving them weights (whether equal or unequal) would be arbitrary and would not serve the purpose.
Similarly, consider the example of child labour and forced labour questions. While the majority of workers may not have to experience these menaces, it is a harsh reality for many, at least in developing countries. Giving weights would mean prioritising one component over the other.
Countries at different stages of development may also have different legal provisions. For example, as is evident throughout the study, work-life balance and gender equality related legislation is also linked with economic development. With certain exceptions, most high-income countries have instituted provisions on paternity leave and parental leave.
If these components are given higher weightage than the other, developing countries’ scores will be comparatively much lower.
Greater weightage to certain areas of labour law can create an inherent bias and also lead to the agents’ skewed efforts to initiate reforms in areas with higher weights. Countries will inherently target laws with greater weightage.
If giving weights were an option, fundamental principles and rights at work would be given higher weights. These are freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, and a safe and healthy working environment.[40]
Even before the amendment of the 1998 Declaration in 2022, ILO had started giving importance to other workplace rights. The 2019 Declaration notes that “all workers should enjoy adequate protection following the Decent Work Agenda, taking into account:
- respect for their fundamental rights;
- an adequate minimum wage, statutory or negotiated;
- maximum limits on working time; and
- safety and health at work.”
Similarly, social protection, or social security (both terms are used interchangeably), is enshrined as such in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). ILO Recommendation 202 suggests that countries should establish and maintain national social protection floors as a nationally defined set of basic social security guarantees that secure protection to prevent or alleviate poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion.
Hence, instead of preferring one component or indicator over the other, the Labour Rights Index has been developed without assigning weights.
Ranking
Similarly, the Labour Rights Index does not “rank” countries.
The ordinal ranking method (for example, “first”, “second”, and “third”) is problematic as it leads to the naming and shaming of countries at the bottom of the list. Moreover, as argued by the World Bank’s Doing Business Report in 2016, rankings may encourage the agents (countries being ranked) to “game the system”.[41] There is a risk that the agents may divert a disproportionate amount of resources and efforts to the areas which are measured/scored while leaving aside areas which are equally important but not scored. To deal with this issue, the Labour Rights Index does not use ordinal ranking, although it covers the whole gamut of labour rights.
The Index does not aim at producing a single number in the form of ranking. Rather it gives a run down on the local labour legislation, supported by detailed Decent Work Checks, updated annually.
The Labour Rights Index, however, does place 135 countries into six categories and rates these from “Decent Work” to “Total Lack of Decent Work”. [42]